Nice job, Nicholas! Well researched and thoughtfully compiled. I would just like to add a point against Lt-Col Higgins’ argument in favor of Strategic Clarity: military folks tend to not grasp the economic dimensions of the US-China-Taiwan relationship. Strategic ambiguity best serves the conjoined economies on both sides of the Strait; a war would result in Mutually Assured Economic Destruction. It is therefore folly to take Beijing officials - even under Xi - literally when they talk about the urgency of reunification. Strategic ambiguity has survived this long because everyone needs it, even though no one wants to admit it. It’s not just about TSMC: closing the Taiwan Strait for any length of time would choke off not only Taiwan’s economy, but China’s too. AND: until the US can find a replacement in its tech supply chains for TSMC, the consequences for the US and the global economy would be too terrible to imagine as well.
This was a great survey, but I have to say, if Lt-Col Higgins' argument was the *most* persuasive one for strategic clarity, I am not impressed with the overall case. A critical weakness in Higgins' case, despite use of multiple potentially semi-relevant historic analogies, was failure to use almost any evidence to ascertain patterns of Chinese misperception, and underestimation, of US resolve. Another thing that could have benefitted the pro-strategic clarity argument would be if it its advocates could more clear separate it as a declarative and strategic communications policy, from related, supporting, capabilities-based policies to boost American power projection capabilities, resilience or diversity of assets in the Western Pacific, or harden Taiwan as a military target. It is possible to do all those latter steps, observable to Beijing, with, or without, a change in American declarative posture to strategic clarity, and it is possible to change declarative policy and strategically communicate clear, unambiguous support for Taiwan, well in advance of shoring up material capabilities to back up the policy and pledges....which could either function as an adequate deterrent....or thrust Taiwan, the US, and China into a quite dangerous perceived 'window of opportunity' to plausibly compel unification by force in advance of upgraded Taiwan and US force improvements.
But I would also say, if the Fang Chi was the *most* persuasive piece argument in favor of retaining strategic ambiguity, that was also a bit concerning. The article weakened its own credibility by treating Chinese gray zone warfare/activities and all-out invasion as fully distinct actions, rather than a potential continuum, and categorically ruling out the latter. But ruling out nothing categorically and taking a continuum approach would surely provide for a more complete evaluation of potential contingencies.
Nice job, Nicholas! Well researched and thoughtfully compiled. I would just like to add a point against Lt-Col Higgins’ argument in favor of Strategic Clarity: military folks tend to not grasp the economic dimensions of the US-China-Taiwan relationship. Strategic ambiguity best serves the conjoined economies on both sides of the Strait; a war would result in Mutually Assured Economic Destruction. It is therefore folly to take Beijing officials - even under Xi - literally when they talk about the urgency of reunification. Strategic ambiguity has survived this long because everyone needs it, even though no one wants to admit it. It’s not just about TSMC: closing the Taiwan Strait for any length of time would choke off not only Taiwan’s economy, but China’s too. AND: until the US can find a replacement in its tech supply chains for TSMC, the consequences for the US and the global economy would be too terrible to imagine as well.
This was a great survey, but I have to say, if Lt-Col Higgins' argument was the *most* persuasive one for strategic clarity, I am not impressed with the overall case. A critical weakness in Higgins' case, despite use of multiple potentially semi-relevant historic analogies, was failure to use almost any evidence to ascertain patterns of Chinese misperception, and underestimation, of US resolve. Another thing that could have benefitted the pro-strategic clarity argument would be if it its advocates could more clear separate it as a declarative and strategic communications policy, from related, supporting, capabilities-based policies to boost American power projection capabilities, resilience or diversity of assets in the Western Pacific, or harden Taiwan as a military target. It is possible to do all those latter steps, observable to Beijing, with, or without, a change in American declarative posture to strategic clarity, and it is possible to change declarative policy and strategically communicate clear, unambiguous support for Taiwan, well in advance of shoring up material capabilities to back up the policy and pledges....which could either function as an adequate deterrent....or thrust Taiwan, the US, and China into a quite dangerous perceived 'window of opportunity' to plausibly compel unification by force in advance of upgraded Taiwan and US force improvements.
But I would also say, if the Fang Chi was the *most* persuasive piece argument in favor of retaining strategic ambiguity, that was also a bit concerning. The article weakened its own credibility by treating Chinese gray zone warfare/activities and all-out invasion as fully distinct actions, rather than a potential continuum, and categorically ruling out the latter. But ruling out nothing categorically and taking a continuum approach would surely provide for a more complete evaluation of potential contingencies.