"On the Imjin War specifically, there isn’t a definitive English-language book that comes to mind." Kenneth M. Swope A Dragon's Head and a Serpent's Tail: Ming China and the First Great East Asian War, 1592–1598. (University of Oklahoma Press, 2009).
There are three narrative histories of the war in English, by Stephen Turnbull, Peter Hawley, and Kenneth Swope. Unfortunately, I don't think we can consider any of them "definitive".
All three are readable and I think beneficial to western readers. But they are all heavily reliant on unreliable secondary sources, and particularly colorful details should be taken with a grain of salt. Even Swope, while doing original work with Chinese sources, goes to secondary accounts for Korean and Japanese perspectives.
Fortunately there has been an uptick in interest in english-language academia, so there is hope for future works more heavily based in the primary sources.
Like other commenters (and perhaps the hosts of the podcast), I'm pretty skeptical that China's historic hegemony is the result of non-Western cultural norms. To me it still seems downstream from power dynamics: when one state massively overpowers all the others, everyone else has to live with them. Perhaps the real issue is over-application of power-balancing theory by IR wonks.
However I do agree with the point about empires committing suicide instead of being murdered. Both China and the US' leadership seems to be in a race to do just that. China has perhaps the more severe structural issues, but I think over the past month the US has taken the lead.
I find the east/west framing of this conversation to be very unhelpful. The imperial tributary suzerainty characteristic of dynastic China is the same basic structure that empires have had in all regions of the world (with superficial variations of course). Pax Sinica is in this sense not substantively different from Pax Romana or any other "Pax".
Indeed, the Delian League, Roman Empire, Persian Empire, Ottoman Empire, Hapsburg Empire, indeed even the Soviet Union, all maintained regional orders predicated upon various levels of control exercised by the dominant imperial center; some territories/peoples being annexed and incorporated; some in relationships of complete political control; some of suzerainty with local autonomy but subordination in international policy, to include the obligation for reciprocal security provision, trading and tributary rights and obligations; and some independent or hostile relationships.
Far from being outside the Western worldview, there is a through-line from Herodotus and Thucydides (note: literally the entire point of the Peloponnesian conflict was *not* the rise of Athens alone threatening Sparta, it was Athens converting the Delian League, which had been an security alliance built in response to the threats from Persia, into a maritime trading empire in which Athens exerted suzerain control over tributary allies, into which Sparta didn't want to be subinfeuded), to Machiavelli to Grotius who all addressed these kinds of systems at length.
I get the impression from this conversation that Kang and Ma are trying to characterize imperial suzerainty as somehow "East Asian" in an attempt to legitimate and valorize an imperial order in East Asia today versus some Westphalian West (which doesn't quite make sense also given that the West hasn't been Westphalian for nearly 100 years). And sure an imperial order in East Asia *might* "solve" the problem of potential conflict in East Asia, but as Jordan and Ilari point out, there are various factors (like the extra-regional ambitions of the PRC) and inconsistencies (like it being the Japanese themselves who have been leading the Americans forward in balancing China) that don't make this obvious or consistent with the desires and policies of regional states themselves.
Your conversation drew an interesting distinction between the Han Chinese (the ethnic people and culture, not the dynasty) and the steppe peoples of the north and west. I think you guys may have missed something important in that discussion: it wasn't the Chinese (Han people) who expanded Chinese territory through war. Chinese territory was only expanded when China was ruled by steppe peoples (Yuan, who were the Mongols, and Qing, who were Manchus, a semi-nomadic people from the north). Yunnan was conquered by the Yuan (not the Chinese), Tibet was conquered first by the Yuan, and later again by the Qing (not the Chinese), Xinjiang was conquered by the Qing (not the Chinese), and Taiwan was conquered by the Qing (not the Chinese) too. (By the way, Sichuan was an ethnic Han kingdom (called Shu) and was basically a part of the original unification of all the ethnic Han kingdoms. I mean, Shu was considered a part of core China and was ruled by Liu Bei, China's greatest hero from Romance of the Three Kingdoms, around 200 AD, if not before. I think we should consider Sichuan a part of core China and not a non-Chinese territory that was conquered by China). Historically, it seems the Han Chinese (non-steppe peoples) are not really into conquering territory that isn't "core China." My hypothesis is that after Xinjiang, Tibet, Taiwan and Yunnan were conquered by steppe peoples who were ruling China, over time they came to be considered a part of "core China" as well. Today, I think the Chinese don't think about conquering territory outside of core China, but they sure don't want anyone else meddling in core China (which now includes Xinjiang, Tibet, and Taiwan). This is very different to the European history mindset, which as your guest pointed out, is all about conquer as much adjacent territory as you can when you get the chance, that's basically every king and warrior's raison d'etre. The same thing just didn't (and doesn't) exist for the Han Chinese. Their mindset is more like, "we are the Middle Kingdom, why would we want to conquer anything else?" That example your guest shared of how the Chinese could have annexed Korea so easily after Korea and China defeated Hideyoshi, but instead withdrew, is really powerful. Could you imagine any medieval European country giving up such an easy opportunity to annex an adjacent country?
I was also thinking this. I think part of the issue is centralising the Chineseness of the Yuan dynasty, when really the Chinese part of the Mongol empire was only one part of their more general expansion. When the Mongols receded, so did China's claims over Tibet and much of the North West.
While European power dynamics may not directly translate to East Asia, they bear striking similarities to the Indian subcontinent's historical and contemporary geopolitical landscape. India, for much of its history, was characterized by disunity and lacked a modern civil service until the latter days of the British Empire. The British colonial rule fundamentally altered India's political dynamics, establishing a central hegemon surrounded by smaller states, akin to the structure observed in East Asia.
The British influence created a power dynamic where India emerged as a central authority, with neighboring countries like Pakistan initially experiencing economic disparities. In the 1950s and 1960s, Pakistan's relative prosperity introduced instability into the region. However, as India achieved greater economic success in the 2000s, the relationship stabilized, partly attributable to the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons.
Interestingly, Europe's evolution with the creation of the European Union (EU) mirrors India's trajectory. The EU's formation has led to increased integration and redistribution of resources among member states, much like India's federal structure. This shift towards greater unity and welfare provision has, however, come at the cost of diminished ambition and economic dynamism among European nations.
As Europe transitions into a more integrated entity, it faces challenges similar to those encountered by India. The focus on welfare and redistribution to poorer regions, while promoting stability, may lead to a long-term decline in economic vigor. This parallel highlights the complex interplay between centralization, economic policy, and regional ambition in shaping geopolitical outcomes.
The discussion was very interesting, and I am totally on board with finding more historical analogies beyond the Thucydides Trap—which, in itself, is a simplification of what was really happening during the Peloponnesian Wars—and extracting more wisdom from East Asian history.
However, I believe we should do this to enrich a global discussion, not to reinforce atavistic distinctions about human nature. If someone wants to draw strong distinctions between the West and the East, they should thoroughly engage with both historical realities.
For example, the analogy about the Song Dynasty bringing in the Mongols to fight wars for them—ultimately leading to their own invasion—is very similar to what happened with the Romans and the Germanic tribes. In Europe, at least, this is a common topic in high school education. Western scholars have long been obsessed with the fall of Rome, so it shouldn't be difficult to observe the similarities between Rome and the Song Dynasty.
Additionally, there is the idea that because there was an empire in what we now call China, and because its emperors claimed some form of continuity across different dynasties, this means they were the same polity. Saying that Han China and Ming China are the same would be like claiming that the Roman Republic and the Holy Roman Empire were the same simply because they both saw themselves as successors of Rome. Anyways, was an interesting debate, and perhaps for me the most interesting part was the discussion about the clash between China, which adhered to its traditional geopolitical worldview, and Japan, which adopted the framework of modernity.
I’m surprised that David got a few important historical facts wrong. For instance, the Song dynasty that lost to Yuan was not the Northern Song Dynasty, which had Liao as a neighbor and was eyeing at 燕云十六州. We are talking about the Southern Song Dynasty here, which is significantly weaker and dealing with Jin instead of the Liao.
Also, the notion of 大一统 is critical to understanding China’s boundaries and why places like Sichuan and Yunnan were part of it. And, btw, between 1000 and 1500 was not when they first became part of the Chinese dynasties. They were already there in the Han dynasty.
"On the Imjin War specifically, there isn’t a definitive English-language book that comes to mind." Kenneth M. Swope A Dragon's Head and a Serpent's Tail: Ming China and the First Great East Asian War, 1592–1598. (University of Oklahoma Press, 2009).
ah yes i'll add this in! started reading that after this interview it's excellent
There are three narrative histories of the war in English, by Stephen Turnbull, Peter Hawley, and Kenneth Swope. Unfortunately, I don't think we can consider any of them "definitive".
All three are readable and I think beneficial to western readers. But they are all heavily reliant on unreliable secondary sources, and particularly colorful details should be taken with a grain of salt. Even Swope, while doing original work with Chinese sources, goes to secondary accounts for Korean and Japanese perspectives.
Fortunately there has been an uptick in interest in english-language academia, so there is hope for future works more heavily based in the primary sources.
Like other commenters (and perhaps the hosts of the podcast), I'm pretty skeptical that China's historic hegemony is the result of non-Western cultural norms. To me it still seems downstream from power dynamics: when one state massively overpowers all the others, everyone else has to live with them. Perhaps the real issue is over-application of power-balancing theory by IR wonks.
However I do agree with the point about empires committing suicide instead of being murdered. Both China and the US' leadership seems to be in a race to do just that. China has perhaps the more severe structural issues, but I think over the past month the US has taken the lead.
Such an interesting conversation that I just bought Kang's book!
I find the east/west framing of this conversation to be very unhelpful. The imperial tributary suzerainty characteristic of dynastic China is the same basic structure that empires have had in all regions of the world (with superficial variations of course). Pax Sinica is in this sense not substantively different from Pax Romana or any other "Pax".
Indeed, the Delian League, Roman Empire, Persian Empire, Ottoman Empire, Hapsburg Empire, indeed even the Soviet Union, all maintained regional orders predicated upon various levels of control exercised by the dominant imperial center; some territories/peoples being annexed and incorporated; some in relationships of complete political control; some of suzerainty with local autonomy but subordination in international policy, to include the obligation for reciprocal security provision, trading and tributary rights and obligations; and some independent or hostile relationships.
Far from being outside the Western worldview, there is a through-line from Herodotus and Thucydides (note: literally the entire point of the Peloponnesian conflict was *not* the rise of Athens alone threatening Sparta, it was Athens converting the Delian League, which had been an security alliance built in response to the threats from Persia, into a maritime trading empire in which Athens exerted suzerain control over tributary allies, into which Sparta didn't want to be subinfeuded), to Machiavelli to Grotius who all addressed these kinds of systems at length.
I get the impression from this conversation that Kang and Ma are trying to characterize imperial suzerainty as somehow "East Asian" in an attempt to legitimate and valorize an imperial order in East Asia today versus some Westphalian West (which doesn't quite make sense also given that the West hasn't been Westphalian for nearly 100 years). And sure an imperial order in East Asia *might* "solve" the problem of potential conflict in East Asia, but as Jordan and Ilari point out, there are various factors (like the extra-regional ambitions of the PRC) and inconsistencies (like it being the Japanese themselves who have been leading the Americans forward in balancing China) that don't make this obvious or consistent with the desires and policies of regional states themselves.
Your conversation drew an interesting distinction between the Han Chinese (the ethnic people and culture, not the dynasty) and the steppe peoples of the north and west. I think you guys may have missed something important in that discussion: it wasn't the Chinese (Han people) who expanded Chinese territory through war. Chinese territory was only expanded when China was ruled by steppe peoples (Yuan, who were the Mongols, and Qing, who were Manchus, a semi-nomadic people from the north). Yunnan was conquered by the Yuan (not the Chinese), Tibet was conquered first by the Yuan, and later again by the Qing (not the Chinese), Xinjiang was conquered by the Qing (not the Chinese), and Taiwan was conquered by the Qing (not the Chinese) too. (By the way, Sichuan was an ethnic Han kingdom (called Shu) and was basically a part of the original unification of all the ethnic Han kingdoms. I mean, Shu was considered a part of core China and was ruled by Liu Bei, China's greatest hero from Romance of the Three Kingdoms, around 200 AD, if not before. I think we should consider Sichuan a part of core China and not a non-Chinese territory that was conquered by China). Historically, it seems the Han Chinese (non-steppe peoples) are not really into conquering territory that isn't "core China." My hypothesis is that after Xinjiang, Tibet, Taiwan and Yunnan were conquered by steppe peoples who were ruling China, over time they came to be considered a part of "core China" as well. Today, I think the Chinese don't think about conquering territory outside of core China, but they sure don't want anyone else meddling in core China (which now includes Xinjiang, Tibet, and Taiwan). This is very different to the European history mindset, which as your guest pointed out, is all about conquer as much adjacent territory as you can when you get the chance, that's basically every king and warrior's raison d'etre. The same thing just didn't (and doesn't) exist for the Han Chinese. Their mindset is more like, "we are the Middle Kingdom, why would we want to conquer anything else?" That example your guest shared of how the Chinese could have annexed Korea so easily after Korea and China defeated Hideyoshi, but instead withdrew, is really powerful. Could you imagine any medieval European country giving up such an easy opportunity to annex an adjacent country?
I was also thinking this. I think part of the issue is centralising the Chineseness of the Yuan dynasty, when really the Chinese part of the Mongol empire was only one part of their more general expansion. When the Mongols receded, so did China's claims over Tibet and much of the North West.
While European power dynamics may not directly translate to East Asia, they bear striking similarities to the Indian subcontinent's historical and contemporary geopolitical landscape. India, for much of its history, was characterized by disunity and lacked a modern civil service until the latter days of the British Empire. The British colonial rule fundamentally altered India's political dynamics, establishing a central hegemon surrounded by smaller states, akin to the structure observed in East Asia.
The British influence created a power dynamic where India emerged as a central authority, with neighboring countries like Pakistan initially experiencing economic disparities. In the 1950s and 1960s, Pakistan's relative prosperity introduced instability into the region. However, as India achieved greater economic success in the 2000s, the relationship stabilized, partly attributable to the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons.
Interestingly, Europe's evolution with the creation of the European Union (EU) mirrors India's trajectory. The EU's formation has led to increased integration and redistribution of resources among member states, much like India's federal structure. This shift towards greater unity and welfare provision has, however, come at the cost of diminished ambition and economic dynamism among European nations.
As Europe transitions into a more integrated entity, it faces challenges similar to those encountered by India. The focus on welfare and redistribution to poorer regions, while promoting stability, may lead to a long-term decline in economic vigor. This parallel highlights the complex interplay between centralization, economic policy, and regional ambition in shaping geopolitical outcomes.
The discussion was very interesting, and I am totally on board with finding more historical analogies beyond the Thucydides Trap—which, in itself, is a simplification of what was really happening during the Peloponnesian Wars—and extracting more wisdom from East Asian history.
However, I believe we should do this to enrich a global discussion, not to reinforce atavistic distinctions about human nature. If someone wants to draw strong distinctions between the West and the East, they should thoroughly engage with both historical realities.
For example, the analogy about the Song Dynasty bringing in the Mongols to fight wars for them—ultimately leading to their own invasion—is very similar to what happened with the Romans and the Germanic tribes. In Europe, at least, this is a common topic in high school education. Western scholars have long been obsessed with the fall of Rome, so it shouldn't be difficult to observe the similarities between Rome and the Song Dynasty.
Additionally, there is the idea that because there was an empire in what we now call China, and because its emperors claimed some form of continuity across different dynasties, this means they were the same polity. Saying that Han China and Ming China are the same would be like claiming that the Roman Republic and the Holy Roman Empire were the same simply because they both saw themselves as successors of Rome. Anyways, was an interesting debate, and perhaps for me the most interesting part was the discussion about the clash between China, which adhered to its traditional geopolitical worldview, and Japan, which adopted the framework of modernity.
Great interview! :)
I’m surprised that David got a few important historical facts wrong. For instance, the Song dynasty that lost to Yuan was not the Northern Song Dynasty, which had Liao as a neighbor and was eyeing at 燕云十六州. We are talking about the Southern Song Dynasty here, which is significantly weaker and dealing with Jin instead of the Liao.
Also, the notion of 大一统 is critical to understanding China’s boundaries and why places like Sichuan and Yunnan were part of it. And, btw, between 1000 and 1500 was not when they first became part of the Chinese dynasties. They were already there in the Han dynasty.
His points about Taiwan has more merits though